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Abstract
Mutually beneﬁcial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual
opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room
for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulﬁlled
his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive judicial
detection skill, litigation fees can be designed to deter opportunistic suits and
simultaneously induce bilateral contractual compliance. With zero detection
skill, as implicitly assumed by most of the economic literature on litigation,
bilateral contractual compliance cannot be induced. We apply our results to
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2”...we are not surely bound to keep our word because
we have given our word to keep it.”
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
1. Introduction
Mutually beneﬁcial agreements are doomed to fail if at least one of the parties fears
that the other one is tempted to cheat. Litigation is supposed to prevent this contractual
opportunism, but gives room for litigational opportunism: Even if a party knows that the
opponent has fulﬁlled his obligations, she might still bring suit1.
This paper investigates the link between litigation and the contractual behavior that
might lead to litigation, the ”underlying behavior”. We show that with positive detection
skill, litigation fees can be designed to deter opportunistic suits, without disencouraging
legitimate ones, and simultaneously induce bilateral contractual compliance. Positive
judicial detection skill is a necessary condition for this motivational eﬀect of litigation fees
on the underlying behavior of the parties. With zero detection skill, bilateral contractual
compliance cannot be induced.
Judicial detection skill is measured by two parameters2: the probability of correctly
forming the opinion that a suit is legitimate, and the probability of wrongly forming this
opinion, if the suit is actually opportunistic. If the probability of a correct decision is
greater than the probability of a wrong one, the judge is said to have positive detection
skill3. Judges are represented by these two conditional probabilities.
In contrast to this approach, most of the literature on litigation represents judges either
as perfect decision-makers4 or by a unique unconditional probability that the plain-
tiﬀ prevails5. Hence the latter papers make the implicit assumption that judges have
zero detection skill. As exceptions, Katz 1990, Polinsky/Shavell 1989 and Polin-
sky/Rubinfeld 1993 should be mentioned6. In Katz’ model, the probability that the
plaintiﬀ wins a frivolous suit is assumed to be zero, while in case of a legitimate suit, his
probability to prevail may be positive. Polinsky/Shavell and Polinsky/Rubinfeld
1The possibility of opportunistic suits is a deviation from the common (and often implicit) assumption
in the Principal-Agent-Literature, that ”contract execution problems never arise...” (Williamson
1985, p. 31).
2In our paper, the term judge refers to any institution that makes decisions on the merits of a case,
e.g. judges, justices, collegial courts or juries.
3Using this tool, we refer to the framework of Ronald Heiner’s theory of imperfect decision-
making. For an introduction into this theory, see Heiner 1983, Heiner 1985, Heiner 1986 and
Heiner/Schmidtchen 1995. We want to point out that in this paper we do not analyze the judge’s
decision-making process itself. On this see e.g. Anderson/Shugart/Tollison 1989, Cohen 1991
or Macey 1994 with a comment by Alexander 1994.
4See e.g. Priest/Klein 1984.
5Among the many see e.g. Gould 1973, Landes 1994 and even Shavell 1995.
6Some others mention two types of judicial errors, see e.g. Posner 1986 or Tullock 1994, without
using this insight for a rigourous analysis.
3assume that a legitimate plaintiﬀ easier can produce evidence; hence frivolous plaintiﬀs
prevail at trial with a lower probability than legitimate ones.
The impact of litigation on the underlying contractual behavior is the subject of our
paper. Most of the literature on litigation disregards this aspect and limits the analysis
to the decision between settlement or trial7. Also the authors that expressly focus on
frivolous suits8 disregard this impact. Moreover, Priest/Klein 1984, Katz 1990 and
Polinsky/Rubinfeld 1993 assume an exogenously ﬁxed quota of frivolous plaintiﬀs.
Such an approach neglects that a potential plaintiﬀ’s decision to bring a frivolous suit
depends on his incentives rather than on his exogenously given type.
An exception is Polinsky/Shavell 1989, who discuss the impact of legal error on the
incentive for potential defendants to obey the law. But they do not analyze the impact
on the plaintiﬀ’s incentives when he decides on his underlying behavior. Since it is the
interaction of the contracting parties that creates a gain from cooperation, the incentive
of neither party should be neglected.
This paper is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes the basic contract game without third party enforcement.
The ineﬃciency of this game’s equilibrium serves to motivate the introduction of
litigation as a second stage in the parties’ interaction.
• Chapter 3 analyzes the two stage game. The ﬁrst stage is the basic contract game,
which describes the underlying behavior. In the second stage one party is given
the opportunity to sue the other. We describe the theory of judicial detection
skill in more detail and relate it to the concept of veriﬁability, which is known
from contract theory. In section 3.5, we derive conditions for bilateral contractual
compliance and state a Theorem.
• In chapter 4 we use this Theorem to analyze how the American and the British
rules to allocate litigation costs can guarantee bilateral contractual compliance.
• Chapter 5 summarizes the analysis and makes suggestions for further research.
2. Contracts without third party enforcement
In this paper, a contract means an agreement between the players Charlie and Lucy
as follows: Charlie promises to pay Y in advance to Lucy. She promises to make an
investment X in return, which produces a gross monetary beneﬁt of Z = Z(X) to
Charlie, if carried out. We assume that the parties are risk neutral payoﬀ maximizers
7See Posner 1986, chapter 21.5, Cooter/Rubinfeld 1989, and the literature on the ”selection
hypothesis”: Priest/Klein 1984, Wittman 1985, Priest 1985, Stanley/Coursley 1990,
and Thomas 1995.
8E.g. Rosenberg/Shavell 1985, Bebchuk 1988, and Miceli 1993.
4and that Z > Y > X > 0. Hence the parties would mutually beneﬁt if both of the
promises were fulﬁlled. But this condition is not suﬃcient to guarantee that the parties
will later actually act as agreed: The contract is not self-enforcing9.
The agreement leads to a one-shot game we denote as Γ. Figure 1 represents the
extensive form of Γ, where Charlie’s payoﬀ is the ﬁrst entry in the brackets, Lucy’s
payoﬀ is the second10.
Figure 1: Basic contract game Γ in extensive form
￿￿
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(Z − Y,Y − X)
Lucy is tempted to cheat instead of honor the contract. We call this behavior of Lucy
”contractual opportunism”. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is the
strategy combination {out;cheat}. This equilibrium is pareto-suboptimal: Both parties
were better oﬀ by playing the path ”in, honor”. It is the anticipation of Lucy’s contractual
opportunism that makes Charlie choose ”out”. Hence both parties would agree to employ
a device that makes ”in” more attractive for C, as long as the gain from cooperation
(Z − X) is larger than the costs of this device. Giving Charlie the option to sue Lucy
for her investment X may serve as such a device, but this opens up another source of
opportunistic behavior: Charlie could be tempted to bring suit even if Lucy has fulﬁlled
her contractual obligation. We call this ”litigational opportunism”.
3. Contracts with litigation
3.1 The game form
If a party brings suit in order to make the other party honor the contract, and the
judge comes to the opinion that the sueing party has not fulﬁlled her own contractual
9In the diction of Telser 1980.
10This game is usually called a ”trust game” - see Kreps 1990, Coleman 1990, G¨ uth/Kliemt 1993,
and Schmidtchen 1993 - even though ”distrust game” would be the more appropriate term.
5obligation, then we assume that the case will be lost. Hence a party whose choice of
action is perfectly veriﬁable by the judge should go to court only if her own investment
actually has been made. Perfect veriﬁability means that the contracting parties expect
an enforcer to discover without error whether an action was actually carried out or
not11. An example of a perfectly veriﬁable input is payment - in general, payments will
be made via a bank or in exchange for a receipt, so the party who actually has made
a payment will often have no diﬃculty to convince an enforcer. With respect to the
veriﬁability of inputs, we distinguish three cases: both of the parties’ investments, only
one, or neither of them is perfectly veriﬁable. The ﬁrst of these cases is trivial: A judge
would perfectly know what the parties actually have played and could simply ”correct”
the parties’ actual choices if they were made in violation of the contractual agreement.
We refer to the second of the three casesand exclude from our analysis that Lucy might
bring suit as well12. We assume that Charlie’s investment is perfectly veriﬁable by third
parties, but not Lucy’s13. Thus our model starts with a contract stage as described by
the game Γ, which models what we call the underlying behavior. Then we introduce that
Charlie, having chosen ”in” and observed Lucy’s reaction, has the option to sue Lucy
in order to make her honor the contract (i.e. invest X as they had agreed upon). Hence
we limit our view to the case that Charlie sues for the fulﬁllment of the contract and
not for receiving back his advance payment14. X is the value of the case or the value at
stake, if litigation takes place. The extensive form of this game with litigation is shown
in Figure 2, where Charlie’s decision nodes are labelled as C1,C2 and C3. Lucy’s node
is labelled as L.
We denote this game form, which is common knowledge, as ˆ Γ. The payoﬀs (and therefore
the parties‘ preferences over the outcomes) in ˆ Γ do not only depend on the contract
parameters (X,Y,Z), but also on the eﬀects litigation has on the players’ payoﬀs. With
the upper case ∆s
t we denote the eﬀect on Charlie’s payoﬀ, the lower case δs
t to Lucy’s,
if Charlie brings suit of status s, given the cost allocation rule t. These eﬀects on the
parties’ payoﬀs depend on
• the amount of the litigation fees
• the litigation cost allocation rule
• the probability that the plaintiﬀ prevails
• the value of the case15
11See Laffont/Tirole 1993, p. 3 on non-veriﬁable inputs.
12The third case - both of the inputs are imperfectly veriﬁable - we will analyze in a sequel paper.
13For the basic idea of our analysis it is not crucial that the veriﬁable input is made ﬁrst.
14If the factor market for Lucy’s contribution is in equilbrium, Charlie could could let someone else
produce Z, if Lucy is to deliver X. Charlie could also sue Lucy to make her pay him Z, which costs
her not more than X, since she is able to produce Z from X.
15If settlement is taken into account, the result of the bargaining would also inﬂuence the eﬀects on
the parties’ payoﬀs. The same holds for the Rule 11, analyzed in Polinsky/Rubinfeld 1993.
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The status of litigation s is either opportunistic or legitimate: To bring suit at C3 - after
the path ”in, cheat” - we call legitimate (s = leg); to sue at C2 we call opportunistic
(s = opp). With qs we denote the probability that Charlie prevails, given the case is of
status s16.
3.2 Litigation fees and cost allocation rules
The parameter t stands for the cost allocation rule the judge has to obey. We analyze
two idealized types of cost allocation rules: Under the American rule (t = a), both of
the parties have to bear the own costs. The British or European rule (t = b) imposes the
winner’s costs upon the loser. Other cost allocation rules are possible17.
16As we discussed above, we disregard that Charlie might bring suit after ”out”. To put the reason for
this more formally: The probability that Charlie prevails is zero, if he sues without having made his
perfectly veriﬁable investment Y .
17E.g. in US civil courts, litigation costs may be shifted to the loser, if the case is ”ﬁled in bad faith”,
see Adams 1995, p. 74. However, whether a suit is opportunistic or was brought ”in bad faith”
is far from being obvious and subject to judicial decision-making. Adams also discusses that the
diﬀerent roles of judges and parties may be the reason why diﬀerent cost allocation regimes exist
- a question we exclude from consideration in this paper. Bebchuk/Chang 1993, p. 7, mention two
more basic rules, the Pro-Plaintiﬀ- and the Pro-Defendant-Rule, and analyze cost allocation with
reference to the ”margin of victory”.
7Litigation costs consist of two parts: First, the opportunity costs of resources the parties
voluntarily spend to inﬂuence the expected outcome of the suit by altering the probability
qs. Second they contain the fee the court imposes18. In this paper we assume that the
parties’ investments, e.g. the hiring of lawyers, have no impact on qs. Therefore the
optimal decision is not to make expenses voluntarily, and the parties’ litigation costs
contain nothing but non-negative fees they have to pay before the judicial decision. Let
P ≥ 0 denote the plaintiﬀ’s and D ≥ 0 the defendant’s ex-ante payment.
It depends on the cost allocation rule what the parties have to bear after the judgement
has been made. They have to take into account this ex-post burden when making their
strategy choice in ˆ Γ. We denote Charlie’s expected burden as pt = pt(D,P,qs) and Lucy’s
as dt. pt consists of what Charlie has to pay if he looses multiplied by the probability of
losing (1−qs), plus what he has to pay in case he wins (multiplied by the probability qs).
The parties’ expected ex-post burdens for the American and the British cost allocation
rules are shown in ﬁgure 3.





qsD + (1 − qs)D = D qs(P + D) + (1 − qs)0
(1 − qs)(P + D) P
Both of these two rules imply that the expected burden to the plaintiﬀ pt is non-
increasing if his probability to prevail qs increases. We limit our analysis to cost allocation
rules that have this property.
3.3 Judicial detection skill
Even under the assumption that the parties do not disagree about the value of X, third
parties - e.g. courts - are in general unable to observe whether this investment actually
has been made by Lucy, if suit is being brought. Therefore it makes sense to assume
that potential litigants do not expect the judge, who decides on non-veriﬁable inputs,
to be free of errors. We assume judges to be benevolent, i.e. they try to make correct
18A fee could also be negative, if the law enforcement system would allow for paying subsidies. In our
model, this possibility can be neglected.
8decisions19.
There is a variety of reasons for judicial errors. Posner 1990 distinguishes ”Questions
of Fact” (p. 203) and ”Questions of Law” (p. 197). We only focus on errors concerning
the true facts of the case, but not how to interpret legal rules or which rule is to be
applied. Judicial competence seems to be a further important factor, lack of information
another20.
We deﬁne r := qleg and w := qopp. Hence r is the conditional probability that a judge
decides in favor of the palintiﬀ, given the suit is actually legitimate, and w is the prob-
ability of making this decision, given the suit is opportunistic. An overview of these
conditional probabilities is given in ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4: Two types of judicial error
Judge’s decision
Suit is legitimate opportunistic
in favor of C
in favor of L
r w
1 − r 1 − w
The basic idea of the (r,w) approach is adapted from Heiner 1983, 198521. There
is a large literature in experimental psychology concerned with the imperfect detection
of signals22. In such experiments a person must decide repeatedly whether a signal is
present or not. The judge is in a very similar situation, when he repeatedly has to decide
whether suits are opportunistic or not. Heiner 1986 was the ﬁrst who applied basic
insights of signal detection theory to a law and economics problem, when giving an
economic rationale for the ”stare decisis” doctrine.
Concerning the parameters r,w ∈ [0,1] we distinguish four cases:
• If (r−w) = 1, the parties expect the judge to decide in favor of the plaintiﬀ only if
19Sanchirico 1995 explicitly models the utility function of judges with respect to this.
Miceli/Co¸ sgel 1994 and Rasmusen 1994 tried to explain such behavior as rational. Devia-
tions from this might be caused by prejudices (see Schrag/Scotchmer 1994), but Ashenfel-
ter/Eisenberg/Schwab 1995 came to the conclusion that the judges‘ background does not play
a signiﬁcant role in decision-making.
20Which is to be distinguished from parties’ imperfect information, which was anlyzed by Bebchuck
1984.
21Heiner/Schmidtchen 1995 applies this concept on game theory. See also Frank 1988.
22An introduction to signal detection theory is provided by Swets 1988.
9the case actually is legitimate. In case of opportunistic litigation, they expect the
judge to always decide in favor of the defendant. Hence they perceive the judge to
have ”perfect detection skill”. In ﬁgure 5, this case is represented by the bold dot
in the upper left corner.
• With (r − w) = 0, the parties expect the judge to decide no better than by
pure chance. The perceived probability of a decision in favor of the plaintiﬀ does
not depend on whether the case is legitimate or opportunistic. This describes the
perception of ”zero detection skill”. In ﬁgure 5, all of the (r,w) combinations on
the diagonal line represent this case.
• (r − w) < 0 means negative detection skill23. The lower right triangle in ﬁgure 5
represents this case.
• In case of (r − w) ∈]0,1[, the judge is perceived as having ”positive detection
skill”. The parties expect the judge to be able to distinguish between legitimate
and opportunistic cases better than by pure chance, but not being free of errors.
The upper left triangle in ﬁgure 5, except for the r = w-line and the bold dot,
stands for this case.






The theory of detection skills provides an operationalization for the concept of input ver-
iﬁability. Perfect detection skill corresponds to the description that this fact is perfectly
veriﬁable, such as Charlies choice in the contract stage. Zero detection skill corresponds
to the complete non-veriﬁability of the relevant fact. The case of (r − w) ∈]0,1[ stands
for imperfect, but positive veriﬁability, which applies to Lucy’s choice of action in the
contract stage. Note that detection skill describes the competence of the third-party
23If a judge is aware of being of this type, he could improve his performance by consequently sentencing
against the opinion he has actually formed.
10enforcer, while the veriﬁability rather describes the diﬃculty of the decision problem
under consideration24.
The observation that judges acquire many years of training and experience in their pro-
fession may induce potential litigants to perceive that judges have positive detection
skill. Hence, it should not be excluded by assumption that litigating parties expect posi-
tive judicial detection skill. In this paper, we allow for positive detection skill and assume
r ≥ w. Furthermore, we assume that the parties have access to the same information
regarding the judicial system, and form rational expectations. Thus the parties’ per-
ceptions are equal when they choose their strategies in the litigation game form. The
assumption of positive detection skill, compared to models that are limited to zero de-
tection skill, provides further insights: We derive results that require positive detection
skill as a necessary condition.
3.4 Conditions for bilateral contractual compliance
The aim of the subsequent analysis is to derive conditions under which bilateral contrac-
tual compliance occurs. By this we mean that ”in, honor, not” is the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium path in ˆ Γ. In this equilibrium, both of the parties fulﬁll their con-
tractual obligations and Charlie does not bring suit. This path provides the maximum
common payoﬀ to the parties: The gain from cooperation, Z − X, is being created and
the parties do not have to spend litigation fees P + D. To reach this result, both types
of opportunism - litigational and contractual - must be prevented.
First we deﬁne the following expressions, given the cost allocation rule t:
• The Selection Condition25: ∆
opp
t < 0 < ∆
leg
t
• The Compliance Condition: δ
leg
t < −X ∧ ∆
opp
t < 0 < ∆
leg
t
Hereafter we denote, for a given cost allocation rule t, the Selection Condition as SCt
and the Compliance Condition as CCt. We show the subgame perfectness by backward
induction, which requires three steps.
1) We ﬁrst consider Charlie’s terminal nodes: If SCt holds, then at C2, Charlie is deterred
from opportunistic suits. At C3, where bringing suit is legitimate, he would bring suit.
Hence given SCt, Charlie brings suit if, and only if, it is legitimate.
2) At Lucy’s node: Given SCt, Lucy’s option ”honor” is followed by ”not”, which brings
her (Y − X) as payoﬀ. Her option ”cheat” would be followed by Charlie’s action ”sue”,
and therefore yields δ
leg
t + Y . If CCt holds, then Lucy’s payoﬀ from ”cheat” is smaller
24Heiner 1983 coined the term Competence-Diﬃculty-Gap or C-D-Gap to describe a divergence be-
tween the complexity of a decision problem and the detection skills of an imperfect decision-maker.
25The term ”selection” must not be confused with the one used in the literature on the selection
hypothesis; see Priest/Klein 1984.
11than the one from ”honor”. Hence, Charlie can expect her to choose ”honor” if CCt
holds.
3) Given CCt, Charlie at his ﬁrst node can expect that Lucy will answer ”honor” on
”in”, in which case Charlie will react with ”not”. This path brings him (Z − Y ), which
is greater than zero, the payoﬀ from ”out”. So it is better for him to choose ”in”.
Hence CCt is suﬃcient for bilateral contractual compliance. In addition to this, CCt is
also necessary for bilateral contractual compliance as well, as we state formally in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 1: In ˆ Γ, bilateral contractual compliance is equivalent to CCt.
Proof: For convenience, in this proof we represent the term ”bilateral con-
tractual compliance” by the acronym bcc. The proof of CCt ⇒ bcc has
already been provided by the backward induction above.
Thus CCt ⇐ bcc is to be shown. This is equivalent to ¬CCt ⇒ ¬bcc, which
is equivalent to δ
opp
t ≥ −X ⇒ ¬bcc ∧¬SCt ⇒ ¬bcc.
δ
opp
t ≥ −X ⇒ ¬bcc holds, since choosing ”honor” would not be the unique
equilibrium action for Lucy (either ”cheat” is superior for her or there is a
tie, hence no unique equilibrium).
(¬SCt ⇒ ¬bcc) holds as well: ¬SCt is equivalent to ∆
opp





t ≤ 0 implies that, at the node C3, ”sue” would not be the unique equlib-
rium action. But if Lucy expected Charlie to play ”not” at C3, the action
”cheat” would be more attractive to her than ”honor”.
∆
opp
t ≥ 0 implies that, at C2, ”not” would not be the unique equilibrium
action. Either of these cases implies ¬bcc: Q.E.D.
If a setting of the parameters (r,w,P,D,t) is such that CCt holds, then it provides
an endogenous incentive for the parties to comply with the contract. Both types of
opportunism are then prevented, the contractual as well as the litigational opportunism.
The Lemma enables one to determine for any setting of the law enforcement system
parameters whether bilateral contractual compliance occurs or not. Hence we can use
this tool to search for answers on three diﬀerent types of questions:
• Given (r,w,t): what combinations of (P,D) should a legislator ﬁx to guarantee
bilateral contractual compliance (see section 4.3 below)?
• Given (P,D,t): what (r,w) is required for bilateral contractual compliance (See
section 4.4 below)?
• Given (r,w,t): should P and D depend on X or be independent26?
26We analyzed this problem with reference to the British rule in Schmidtchen/Kirstein 1996.
123.5 Implications for judicial detection skill
In chapter 3.1 we mentioned that we limit our analysis to cost allocation rules that
impose on the plaintiﬀ an expected burden, pt(D,P,qs), which is non-increasing in qs.
Stated formally, this means:
∀t ∈ {a;b} :
∂pt
∂qs ≤ 0
If an allocation rule meets this condition, this implies a further important property:
The condition that keeps a potential plaintiﬀ from opportunistic suits, but not from
legitimate ones, denoted SCt, only holds if judges have positive detection skill. This is
stated formally in our next Lemma.
Lemma 2: In ˆ Γ, given a cost allocation rule t such that ∀s ∈ {leg;opp} :
∂pt
∂qs ≤ 0, then SCt ⇒ r > w.
Proof: In case of litigation, Charlie receives his claim X with probability
qs and has to expect a litigation cost ex-post burden pt. Hence the expected
eﬀect on Charlie’s payoﬀ is: ∆s
t = qsX − pt(D,P,qs).
From ∂pt/∂qs ≤ 0 and X > 0 it follows ∂∆s















t ⇒ r > w
If SCt holds, then potential plaintiﬀs will sue if, and only if, it is legitimate. One mis-
interpretation of this result should be avoided: Judges must not take sueing as a signal
of legitimacy. Doing so and deciding in favor of any suit being brought would create
an incentive for opportunistic litigation. The reason is quite simple: To decide like this
means r = w = 1, which implies zero detection skill. But SCt requires positive detection
skill. Even if SCt holds and the ”selection” between opportunistic and legitimate suit
works, the judge has to examine each case with positive detection skill27.
This Lemma enables us now to derive the main result of this paper, as stated in the
following Theorem:
Theorem: Given ˆ Γ and a cost allocation rule t such that ∀s ∈ {leg;opp} :
∂pt/∂qj ≤ 0, then positive detection skill is necessary (but not suﬃcient) for
bilateral contractual compliance.
27Polinsky/Rubinfeld 1993 discuss the same problem and come to a diﬀerent solution. Even if their
mechanism to deter frivolous suits works, they claim that the probability of frivolous suits needs to
be positive. We avoid this contradictory result by only requiring that the mechanism must not keep
judges from being alert.
13Proof: From Lemma 1 it follows that bilateral contractual compliance im-
plies CCt, which by Deﬁnition implies SCt. Lemma 2 stated SC ⇒ r > w.
Since the implication is transitive, the Theorem follows: Q.E.D.
Hence it is necessary for bilateral contractual compliance that the potential litigants
perceive judges to have positive detection skill, even if judicial benevolence is assumed.
Or, to use an equivalent formulation: With the perception of zero (or negative) detection
skill, ”in, honor, not” is not the unique subgame perfect equilibrium path in ˆ Γ. This result
holds at least for the broad set of cost allocation rules we take into consideration28. The
Theorem might provide an explanation why papers that have implicitly assumed zero
detection skill disregarded the idea of contractual compliance and limited their focus to
the decision between settlement and trial.
With judges of zero detection skill and t ∈ {a;b}, it is impossible to ﬁx litigation fees P
and D such that Charlie and Lucy are motivated to honor their contractual obligations.
If the CCt does not hold, then at least one of the parties must be afraid that the other
one will deviate from the path ”in, honor, not”. A judge of positive detection skill with
an appropriate speciﬁcation of t,P and D commits each of the parties to the path ”in,
honor, not” and allows them to rely on the expectation that the opponent is committed
as well. But with zero detection skill, this commitment is impossible.
Note that the result stated in the theorem is independent of what means are available to
the parties during the litigation process: Even if one takes settlement, counterclaims and
pre-trial discovery into account or assumes that the parties’ expenses have an inﬂuence on
the probability to prevail, these steps of the litigation stage would inﬂuence the values
of ∆s
t and δs
t, but the theorem is valid in any of the cases. To inﬂuence the parties’
underlying behavior and motivate them to bilateral contractual compliance, CCt must
hold: in ˆ Γ this means ∆
opp
t < 0 < ∆
leg
t and δleg < −X. In the following chapter we
derive ∆s
t,δs
t for our previously made assumptions. This serves to evaluate whether it
is possible for bilateral contractual compliance to be induced under the American and
under the British cost allocation rules.
4. Application to the American and the British rules
4.1 Expected eﬀects on payoﬀs through litigation
The following ﬁgure 6 states the expected eﬀects on the payoﬀs if Charlie brings suit.
Remember that ∆s
t is the expected eﬀect which litigation has on Charlie’s payoﬀ, and
δs
t is the eﬀect Lucy expects on her payoﬀ. These expected eﬀects depend on whether
the status s of the case is opportunistic (opp) or legitimate (leg), on the value of the
case X and on litigation cost regime (t,P,D);t ∈ {a;b}. P,D consists of fees, since the
parties’ expenses are assumed to have no inﬂuence on the probability that the plaintiﬀ
28A caveat that is not really an imposition since the excluded rules are unrealistic.
14prevails, denoted as qs. The litigation stage is limited to a judicial decision: We do not
take settlement, discovery and counterclaims into regard. The aim is to derive conditions
for bilateral contractual compliance.







qs · X − P qs · X − (1 − qs)(P + D)
−qs · (X + P + D) −qs · X − D
Given the American rule, Charlie gets X if he prevails (this happens with probability qs)
and nothing otherwise. In both of these cases he has to bear his own litigation fees P.
Lucy has to pay X with probability qs and to bear her fees D. With probability 1 − qs,
she has to pay nothing and receives no imbursement for her fees D.
Under the British rule, Charlie receives X and the reimbursement for his litigation fees
P with probability qs. If he loses the case, he has to pay the whole litigation fees P +D,
which occurs with probability (1 − qs). If Charlie prevails, Lucy has to pay X and the
whole fees P + D. Otherwise her expected payoﬀ eﬀect is zero.
Using these expressions for the expected eﬀects on the payoﬀs resulting from litigation,
we can now specify the conditions for bilateral compliance for the two diﬀerent litigation
cost allocation rules. According to Lemma 1, bilateral contractual compliance under rule
t will occur if the Compliance Condition CCt holds, i.e. (∆
opp





Substituting the expressions given in ﬁgure 6, this gives the Compliance Condition for
the American rule Ca:
CCa ⇔ P ∈]wX,rX[∧D > (1 − r)X
⇔ w < P
X < r > X − D
X
To restate the Compliance Condition for the British rule Cb, we ﬁrst deﬁne m(w,r) :=
max{1 − r
r ; w
1 − w}. Then the Compliance Condition is
CCb ⇔ (D + P) ∈]m(r,w) · X, r
1 − rX[
⇔ w < P + D
X + P + D < r > X
X + D + P
15From the second rows of these formulations for CCa and CCb, it can easily be seen that
the result stated in the Theorem holds for both the British and the American rules. The
perception of positive detection skill (i.e. r > w) is necessary, however not suﬃcient, for
bilateral contractual compliance.
4.2 Sets of litigation fees supporting compliance
4.2.1 Compliance corridor for the American rule
For each of the two cost allocation rules we deﬁne the set of (D,P) combinations that
support bilateral contractual compliance as Kt. The graphical representation we call the
contractual compliance corridor. For the American rule, this corridor (see ﬁgure 7) is
given by
Ka = {(D,P)|D > (1 − r)X ∧ P ∈]wX,rX[}






(1 − r) · X D
Ka
The American rule does not only require r > w as a necessary condition for bilateral
contractual compliance (with r = w, the corridor between the two horizontal lines in
ﬁgure 7 would be empty, since the borderlines do not belong to the compliance corridor).
16A second necessary condition is that D needs to be positive. The defendant’s litigation
fee is a negative externality the plaintiﬀ creates by bringing suit. The american rule
requires this externality to induce bilateral contractual compliance. If D is too small,
the Compliance Condition CCt is impossible to hold. In this case, Lucy will prefer her
action ”cheat” over ”honor”, which keeps Charlie from doing what he promised to do in
the contract.
This makes it clear that bilateral contractual compliance does not only require to solve
the problem of litigational opportunism, but also to prevent contractual opportunism.
Even if SCt holds, D can be speciﬁed as too small, so that the CCt does not hold. In
ﬁgure 7, this case is represented by the box left of the compliance corridor Ka. Besides
the prevention of litigational opportunism, there must be an incentive for the potential
defendant to honor the contract instead of cheating and being sued.
This result concerning the American rule has a normative implication, which might sound
somewhat surprising: If the parties, as we assumed here, do not make investments in the
case aside from the litigation fees, the legislator should threaten potential defendants
by charging a fee D > (1 − r)X in case of litigation. Defendants need to be punished
for being sued. Failure to do so keeps ”in, honor, not” from being the unique subgame
perfect equlibrium path - either ”in, cheat, sue” or ”out” will be played by the parties
if only SCt, but not CCt, holds.
4.2.2 Compliance corridor for the British rule
With Kb we denote the set of (P,D) combinations that support bilateral contractual
compliance under the British rule. The compliance corridor
Kb =
￿







is shown in ﬁgure 8.
Under the British or European rule, a minimum fee for being sued is not necessary for
bilateral contractual compliance. In case of zero detection skill, the compliance corridor
is empty. With r > w the corridor in ﬁgure 8 is non-empty. In contrast to the American
rule, D = 0 does not exclude bilateral contractual compliance.
4.2.3 Comparision of the American and the British rule
Under the British rule, either player’s fee can be seen as a kind of externality that is - at
least partly - internalized to the other player by this rule. As long as P > 0, a potential
defendant has to expect a positive ex-post burden. The same holds for the plaintiﬀ: If
he brings suit, even with P = 0, he has to take a positive expected burden into account.
The literature on litigation costs provides at least two arguments in favor of the Ameri-







m(r,w) · X Kb
can rule: Adams 199529 mentions that the externality created by the British rule is a
source of ineﬃciency that, if to be borne by rightholders, weakens the right for which
they seek protection30. Posner 1973 was the ﬁrst who said that the American rule
provides a weaker incentive to refuse settlement. Compared with settlement, trial is seen
as an ineﬃcient device for conﬂict resolution, hence this leads to the conclusion that the
American rule is the eﬃcient one.
Since we analyze the incentive eﬀect of litigation on the underlying behavior, our result
does not favor either of the two rules31: If judges are perceived to have positive detection
skill, then both of the rules can support bilateral contractual compliance. Under both of
them provide a non-empty set of (P,D) combinations is derivable that makes the parties
honor their contractual promises and keep out of the courts. To state this formally:
∀t ∈ {a;b} : (P,D) ∈ Kt ⇔ bcc
Hence both of the rules are able to induce an eﬃcient outcome in the game form ˆ Γ. The
29p. 81, 87.
30However, Adams 1995 favors the british rule.
31Hence our model does not explain why two diﬀerent rules exist. Adams 1995 claims that the diﬀerent
roles of judges in the diﬀerent court systems should be seen as the decisive factors why diﬀerent
rules evolved.
18possibility to litigate is only important as a threat if the potential defendant chooses
cheat instead of honor; but in equilibrium this threat will not be carried out. Then
the parties act ”in the shadow of the court” without actual litigation taking place. In
case of zero detection skill, neither of the two rules can guarantee bilateral contractual
compliance.
4.3 Sets of detection skill that support compliance
In the previous section we derived sets of (P,D) combinations that support bilateral
contractual compliance for given values of r,w and a given litigation cost allocation rule
t. For each of the two cost allocation rules under consideration, we can also derive from
the condition for bilateral contractual compliance, CCt, a set of (r,w) combinations that
support bilateral compliance, if P and D are given. For rule t we denote this set as Ft,















X + P + D
< r >
X
X + P + D
￿
From these expressions, as well, the result stated in the Theorem can easiliy be seen:
With zero (or even negative) detection skill r = w, the r,w combination is not in
the compliance ﬁeld and bilateral contractual compliance cannot occur. To state this
formally: ∀t ∈ {a;b} : r ≤ w ⇒ (r,w) 6∈ Ft
Despite the fact that the exact position of their lower and right borderlines is diﬀer-
ent, in a unit box (with r on the vertical and w on the horizontal axis) the graphical
representations of these two sets (see ﬁgure 9) appear to look similar.
For both of the rules, two cases are to be distinguished:
• If X ≤ (D + P), then the right inequality in the description of the set Ft is not
a binding condition. In a (r,w) unit box, the set Ft is a rectangle with its lower
right corner on the (r = w) line (its upper left corner is the point r = 1,w = 0).
This case is shown in the right part of ﬁgure 9.
• If X > D + P, the right inequality is a binding condition. This case is depicted in
the left part of ﬁgure 9. The set Ft is represented as the dark square in the upper
left corner of the unit box. Due to the additional binding constraint, its lower right
corner does not touch the (r = w) line. The exact positions of the set’s borderline
depend on which rule t ∈ {a;b} is being considered.









Case of l > (D + P) Case of l ≤ (D + P)
For both of these cases this result provides a testable hypothesis: If the two parties
comply to a contract, given the parameters (X,Y,Z) and the litigation cost regime
(D,P,t), our model predicts that those parties that decide to honor the contract perceive
the judge to have (r,w) ∈ Ft. In regard to parties that are confronted with this situation
and do not honor their contractual agreement, the model predicts that their perception
of the judicial detection skill is (r,w) is not in Ft.
5. Conclusions
In the paper we showed that bilateral contractual compliance requires judicial positive
detection skill as a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition. This result is independent of
the potential litigant’s risk attitude. With positive judicial detection skill and appropri-
ately designed litigation fees, contracting parties can be motivated to comply with their
contract and carry out the promises they agreed upon. In this case, the mere existence
of the enforcement system makes the parties comply - they act ”in the shadow of the
courts”.
The result we state in our Theorem does not depend on the procedure that takes place
in the litigation stage. Even if settlement, counterclaims or discovery are taken into
regard or if one assumes that the parties’ expenses on the case have an inﬂuence on
the probability to prevail, the incentive structure must be such that the Compliance
Condition holds to guarantee bilateral contactual compliance. Under the assumption
that in the litigation stage these options are not available and only a judicial decison
occurs, we showed that the American rule and the British rule provide the possibility to
prevent litigational as well as contractual opportunism.
20In sequel papers, we plan to apply the idea of judicial detection skill to tort and crim-
inal cases. Besides this, empirical research should be done to show the link between
perceived judicial detection skill and contractual compliance. We will analyze contracts
where both of the inputs are imperfectly veriﬁable, hence both of the parties should
have the opportunity to sue, or where the parties have the choice between actions of
diﬀerent degrees of veriﬁability. Parties may have diﬀerent perceptions of (r,w) or their
investments may have inﬂuence on the probability to prevail, thus on the outcome of the
case. The decision-making problem of judges should be described from the viewpoint of
imperfect decision-making theory to give a rationalization for the perception of r > w.
We hope this approach to provide new insights on multi-level court systems.
Our result gives a plausible explanation why most of the literature on the economic
analysis of litigation does not analyze the underlying behavior that might lead to trial,
and focuses on the decision between settlement and trial: The implicit assumption of
zero judicial detection skill made by these papers would lead to the result that the law
enforcement system is not able to motivate interacting parties to bilateral contractual
compliance.
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24List of Symbols
a American cost allocation rule (each party bears own costs)
b British or European rule (loser bears both parties‘ costs)
bcc Bilateral contractual compliance: ”in, honor, not” is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium path in ˆ Γ
Cj Charlie’s decision node j ∈ {1;2;3}
CCt Compliance Condition: δs
t < −X ∧ SCt
cheat Lucy’s action to not honor the contract
dt(D,P,qj) Expected ex-post litigation costs to the defendant, given rule t
D Defendant’s litigation fees (to be paid ex-ante)
δs
t Expected eﬀect on Lucy’s payoﬀ by a suit of
status s, given cost allocation rule t ∈ {a,b}
∆s
t Expected eﬀect on Charlie‘s payoﬀ by a suit of
status s, given rule t
Ft Compliance ﬁeld: Set of r,w combinations that support bcc, given rule t
fri Frivolous suit: after paths (out) and (in, honor)
Γ The basic contract game
ˆ Γ The litigation game form
i Player; i ∈ {C;L}
in Charlie’s action to make his investment Y
j Index for Charlie’s decision nodes Cj ∈ {C1..C3}
honor Lucy’s action to make her contractual investment X
Kt Compliance corridor: Set of (P,D) combinations that support bcc, given rule t
L Lucy’s decision node
leg Legitimate suit: after (in,cheat)
m(r,w) = max{1 − r
r l; wl
1 − w}
not Charlie’s action not to sue
out Charlie’s action not to make his investment Y
P Plaintiﬀ‘s litigation fee (to be paid ex-ante)
pt(D,P,qj) Ex post litigation costs the plaintiﬀ expects, given rule t
qs Probability that a plaintiﬀ prevails, given the suit is of status s ∈ {fri;leg}
r Probability that a plaintiﬀ prevails, having brought a legitimate suit
s Status of a case; s ∈ {fri;leg}
SCt Selection Condition: ∆
fri
t < 0 < ∆
lef
t
(Charlie sues if, and only if, it is legitimate)
sue Charlie’s action to sue for X
w Probability that plaintiﬀ prevails, having brought an opportunistic suit
X Lucy’s contractual obligation (e.g. some work for Charlie)
Y Charlie’s relation speciﬁc investment (advance payment)
Z Charlie’s monetary value from Lucy’s investment X
25